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Quotations about Liberty and Power

About this Quotation:

Mises had been an adviser to the Austrian government on money and banking matters following the First World War when the full extent of the massive losses, inflation, and national debt incurred during the war began to be realised. He also witnessed the hyperinflation the Weimar Republic suffered in 1923, the doomed attempts by Britain to return to a gold standard based upon pre-war exchange rates which did not take into account the dramatic changes in relative prices which had taken place during the war, and then the stock market collapse of 1929. Out of these momentous events he formulated his theory of money and the business cycle which in summary is a strong defence of the gold standard to prevent governments and their central banks from manipulating currency, and a theory of the business cycle which argued that government manipulation of interest rates for poltiical purposes created malinvestments by businesses which were eventually shown to be unsustainable and needed to be liquidated and reinvested elsewhere, thus causing a “depression.”

Other quotes about Money & Banking:

17 October, 2011

MisesB300

Mises on classical liberalism and the gold standard (1928)

Read the full quote in context here.

In an essay written in 1928 the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) argued that the major reason why classical liberals in the 19th century favored money based on a gold standard was because it meant that the value of money/gold was “independent of any direct manipulation by governments, political policies, public opinion or parliaments”:

Monetary policy of the preliberal era was either crude coin debasement, for the benefit of financial administration (only rarely intended as Seisachtheia, i.e., to nullify outstanding debts), or still more crude paper money inflation. However, in addition to, sometimes even instead of, its fiscal goal, the driving motive behind paper money inflation very soon became the desire to favor the debtor at the expense of the creditor…

With the attainment of gold monometallism, liberals believed the goal of monetary policy had been reached…. The value of gold was then independent of any direct manipulation by governments, political policies, public opinion or parliaments. So long as the gold standard was maintained, there was no need to fear severe price disturbances from the side of money. The adherents of the gold standard wanted no more than this, even though it was not clear to them at first that this was all that could be attained.

The full passage from which this quotation was taken can be be viewed below (front page quote in bold):

Liberalism and the Gold Standard

Monetary policy of the preliberal era was either crude coin debasement, for the benefit of financial administration (only rarely intended as Seisachtheia, i.e., to nullify outstanding debts), or still more crude paper money inflation. However, in addition to, sometimes even instead of, its fiscal goal, the driving motive behind paper money inflation very soon became the desire to favor the debtor at the expense of the creditor.

In opposing the depreciated paper standard, liberalism frequently took the position that after an inflation the value of paper money should be raised, through contraction, to its former parity with metallic money. It was only when men had learned that such a policy could not undo or reverse the “unfair” changes in wealth and income brought about by the previous inflationary period and that an increase in the purchasing power per unit [by contraction or deflation] also brings other unwanted shifts of wealth and income, that the demand for return to a metallic standard at the debased monetary unit’s current parity gradually replaced the demand for restoration at the old parity.

In opposing a single precious metal standard, monetary policy exhausted itself in the fruitless attempt to make bimetallism an actuality. The results which must follow the establishment of a legal exchange ratio between the two precious metals, gold and silver, have long been known, even before Classical economics developed an understanding of the regularity of market phenomena. Again and again Gresham’s Law, which applied the general theory of price controls to the special case of money, demonstrated its validity. Eventually, efforts were abandoned to reach the ideal of a bimetallic standard. The next goal then became to free international trade, which was growing more and more important, from the effects of fluctuations in the ratio between the prices of the gold standard and the suppression of the alternating [bimetallic] and silver standards. Gold then became the world’s money.

With the attainment of gold monometallism, liberals believed the goal of monetary policy had been reached. (The fact that they considered it necessary to supplement monetary policy through banking policy will be examined later in considerable detail.) The value of gold was then independent of any direct manipulation by governments, political policies, public opinion or parliaments. So long as the gold standard was maintained, there was no need to fear severe price disturbances from the side of money. The adherents of the gold standard wanted no more than this, even though it was not clear to them at first that this was all that could be attained.

[More works by Ludwig von Mises (1881 – 1973) and on The Austrian School of Economics]